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How and why a people responds affirmatively to momentous events 
in the life of its nation is an intriguing question for the social historian. 
Part of the answer may be found in the degree to which a populace 
can connect such events to traditional (and often idealistic) themes in 
its culture, themes which have had wide currency and restatement. 
This kind of identification can be seen particularly in wartime; twice 
in this century large segments of the American population rallied 
around the call to preserve democracy under the guise of fighting a 
"war to end all wars" and another to preserve the "four freedoms." But 
popular perceptions of these global conflicts were not without both 
deliberate and unconscious manipulation in many areas of the 
culture, including commercial motion pictures. 
Hollywood produced hundreds of feature films during World War 
II which depicted facets of that conflict on the domestic homefront, 
the soil of friendly Allies and far-flung battlefields. Many of the films 
showed no more than a crude addition of the war theme to plots that 
would have been filmed anyway in peacetime, such as gangster stories 
and musical comedies. But other movies reached a deeper level in 
subtly linking the war to American traditions and ideals. Sahara,1 
Columbia Pictures' biggest money-maker in 1943, starring Humphrey 
Bogart in a finely understated performance, is such a motion picture. 
Students of American culture will find Sahara and its never-filmed 
predecessor script, "Trans-Sahara," artifacts especially useful in ex-
amining two phenomena: the process of government pressure on 
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movie studios to ensure that the "approved" war. aims were presented 
to tens of millions of domestic and international viewers; and the 
possibilities for artfully harnessing wartime patriotism to cherished 
American values of individual self-reliance, self-sacrifice, and the na-
tion's role as beacon of hope and right to a benighted world. 
In all of America's wars of the present century, the use of propa-
ganda has been of great importance in attempting to unify the country 
behind a single set of war aims, define who the enemy was, why he 
fought, and why he had to be defeated. Manipulation of thought and 
emotion has become essential in generating a high level of morale and 
commitment. In World War II the Office of War Information (OWI) 
was the official arm of government propaganda, directing sophis-
ticated appeals to particular groups of the population in contrast to 
the often crude efforts of the Committee on Public Information dur-
ing World War I. But overt government propaganda —whether of-
ficial statements, press releases, documentary, motivational and hate 
films—is ultimately less persuasive than images linked to subliminal as 
well as overt emotional experiences.2 Elmer Davis, Director of the 
OWI, recognized these possibilities: "The easiest way to inject a prop-
aganda idea into most people's minds is to let it go in through the 
medium of an entertainment picture when they do not realize that 
they are being propagandized." Hollywood, for its part, had no diffi-
culty perceiving the relationship between art and persuasion; Darryl 
Zanuck, addressing the Writers' Congress in 1943, stated plainly that 
"if you have something worth while to say, dress it in the glittering 
robes of entertainment and you will find a ready market. . . . Without 
entertainment no propaganda film is worth a dime."3 
President Franklin Roosevelt was aware of the propaganda poten-
tial, but he also saw the issue in terms of larger policy questions. A 
month after Pearl Harbor he spoke of the need to convey to the Amer-
ican populace a more accurate understanding of six crucial aspects of 
the conflict: the issues of the war; the enemy's goals and character-
istics; the concept of the United Nations coalition; the importance of 
domestic production; civilian roles on the homefront; and the realities 
faced by the Allied fighting men. Both the president and OWI direc-
tor Davis were eager to interpret these war aims on the silver screen, 
making the motion picture an essential "weapon of democracy," 
supplying morale "vitamins" for nomefront Americans, men in 
uniform and Allied and neutral nations scattered over the globe. New 
York Times critic Bosley Crowther took the same position in January 
1942, arguing that movies should be part of a "program of national 
persuasion."4 
The entertainment industry played an important role in stimulat-
ing patriotism and morale and propagating the officiai version of the 
war after 1941. Some of the film capital's best talents—director John 
Ford, Frank Capra and John Huston, for example—made many orien-
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tation, motivational, and documentary films directly for the govern-
ment; perhaps the best known are the Why We Fight series and The 
Battle of San Pietro. Stars of stage, screen and broadcast journalism 
spoke directly and personally to the homefront. One measure of their 
contribution is the fact that while ten percent of war bond sales outlets 
were movie theaters, twenty percent of all bonds were sold there.5 
Behind many of them stood the motion picture companies which were 
inclined to cooperate with government propaganda efforts for several 
reasons of their own. Many actors and studio personnel were instinc-
tively patriotic and needed no prompting to use their public images 
and influence in helping win the war. Also, like any large industry of 
the day, Hollywood needed raw materials which were suddenly scarce, 
and cooperation with government seemed more likely to ensure an 
adequate supply than indifference or independence.6 Beyond this, 
however, studio executives concluded that some cooperation with 
government propaganda efforts was necessary to forestall outright 
censorship or even a takeover of the industry.7 
Despite considerable studio willingness to voluntarily cooperate 
with the government, the Office of War Information's Bureau of Mo-
tion Pictures (BMP) grasped unprecedented powers to manipulate 
and control the screen industry, through both persuasion and in-
timidation. This was due, in part, to the fact that Hollywood, prior to 
the establishment of BMP influence, showed little expertise in identi-
fying war aims and artfully incorporating them into movie scripts: 
In the summer of 1942 Hollywood had under consideration or 
in production 213 films that dealt with the war in some manner. 
Forty percent of those focused on the armed forces, usually in 
combat. Less than 20 percent dealt with the enemy, and most of 
those portrayed spies and saboteurs. Other categories—the war 
issues, the United Nations, and the home front —received 
minimal attention. Even more disturbing to OWI, Hollywood 
had simply grafted the war to conventional mystery and action 
plots or appropriated it as a backdrop for frothy musicals and 
flippant comedies. Interpretation of the war remained at a 
rudimentary level: the United States was fighting because it had 
been attacked, and it would win. 
Lowell Mellett, chief of the BMP, identified a related problem: 
"Somehow it is almost impossible to feel the war here in America 
where we seem to be safe. We are still in a state that makes it necessary 
for us to keep telling ourselves that it is true, that it is real, that we are 
part of it." Moreover, some studio executives believed that films 
should be totally escapist to help people forget current difficulties. 
Direct intervention into the Hollywood production process seemed the 
logical solution. Establishing a Hollywood office in mid-1942, the 
BMP staff prepared a "Manual for the Motion Picture Industry." 
Films, it urged, should portray the war as a struggle against fascism, 
whether at home or abroad, thus exposing the evils of racial or reli-
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gious bigotry, as well as more obvious targets like militarism and 
totalitarianism.8 
In the months after mid-1942, the BMP initially sought only to re-
quest changes in finished scripts, but by the end of the year it reached 
for larger power over synopses or outlines of even projected films, as 
well as the right to recommend deletions from the "long cut," the final 
step before processing the print for commercial distribution. By late 
1943 the BMP had persuaded every studio but one to submit all scripts 
for review before production. Threatened with a denial of export 
licenses for films not receiving the BMP imprimatur, Hollywood 
buckled under the pressure.9 
Understandably enough, then, war themes became common in 
commercial motion pictures. Of a total of 1,313 movies made in 1942, 
1943, and 1944, twenty-eight percent portrayed some aspect of the 
conflict. At least through 1943, the public wanted to see the war por-
trayed on the silver screen; war films, or those with war-related 
themes, were not only good for the country, they were good for box of-
fice receipts. Hollywood had an audience of 80 or 90 million viewers a 
week for whatever it chose to depict. The cinema was mass entertain-
ment in 1942, having rebounded dramatically from the decline in at-
tendance during the Depression. The war nourished movie receipts, as 
shortages in gasoline and rubber denied homefront Americans one of 
their major customary pleasures, thereby ushering millions back into 
the theaters.10 But exactly what should those audiences see? 
The Office of War Information's ideal combat movie should show 
"an ethnically and geographically diverse group of Americans [who] 
would articulate what they were fighting for, pay due regard to the 
role of the Allies, and battle an enemy who was formidable but not a 
superman."1 What it did not want was Hollywood's dabbling in for-
eign policy. This fear is illustrated by the BMP's reaction to "Trans-
Sahara," a script proposed by Columbia Pictures in mid-1942, at a 
time when the Bureau was just beginning to establish guidelines and 
was still relying on voluntary cooperation from the studios. "Trans-
Sahara" was to be the story of a Nazi railroad from the Mediterranean 
to Dakar. But the eager studio had far more in mind than depicting 
the struggle to thwart completion of the crucial line; in a summary 
prepared for the BMP it listed the following intents: 
1) We will try to show more fully why France collapsed. How the 
Nazi strategy succeeded there in undermining civilian and soldier 
morale, separating a government from its Allies and setting group 
against group. 
2) We plan to emphasize the inherent democratic spirit of the vast 
majority of the French nation, and how we eventually hope to 
mobilize this potential strength to aid in the defeat of the Axis. 
3) We will try to fully dramatize the complete disillusionment of 
the collaborationists, proving that there can be no bargaining with 
Axis ideology. 
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4) We will dramatize the global nature of this war. The equity that 
each of the United Nations possesses in the serious menace of the 
Trans-Sahara Railroad. Its empending [sic] completion at the port 
of Dakar—the jumping-off place for Hitler's armadas to conquer 
South America. Its threatening death-grip on all transport across 
the South Atlantic, to Africa, India, and Australia. 
5) We plan to emphasize the great role that the Colonial peoples 
can take in defeating the Axis.12 
The head of the BMP's Hollywood office granted approval to film 
such a belabored production, but Bureau chief Lowell Mellett was of a 
different mind, calling the story "pretty terrible" and "an attempt to 
make one phase of the war fît a hack fictional theme, with a few 'mon 
Dieu's' and 'sacre bleu's' thrown in for local color." But the nub of the 
matter was Columbia's zeal to interpret American foreign relations 
and "invent their own answers to important questions." The proposed 
depictions of the Vichy government and Marshall Petain and Pierre 
Laval were particularly sensitive. Mellett wrote that "I won't under-
take to say what our policy should be with relation to those two men, 
and I think Columbia Pictures certainly should not. The African 
theater of war involves strategical questions, the solution of which 
should be attempted by those in the allied governments responsible for 
doing so rather than by someone who can provide a solution to suit a 
fanciful yarn." BMP headquarters in Washington strongly urged 
Columbia to shelve the script, with the further warning that no export 
license could possibly be granted for such a film.13 
"Trans-Sahara" would undoubtedly have been both an artistic and 
box office disaster, so freighted was it with geopolitical baggage. Co-
lumbia complied with the BMP request in early September and de-
clined to buy the story from its writer.14 But the idea of a war film with 
a Saharan backdrop was not forgotten; it was hardly likely, given the 
intense American interest in North Africa, the first major battle test 
for American ground troops in the European theater. By October, 
1942, Columbia was at work on a new script, and a year later Sahara 
premiered to enthusiastic audiences. Not only was it a more artful 
story, this film much more subtly linked the war's aims with hallowed 
images in the American character. Through subliminal identification 
it would generate a far more complete affirmation of American's role 
in Europe and the world than the crude propagandizing of a "Trans-
Sahara." The BMP did not dictate the story line of Sahara, but in 
quashing its predecessor it paved the way for a more effective na-
tionalistic picture. 
Sahara, released in October, was one of the most popular movies 
of the day and the greatest money-maker for Columbia Pictures in 
1943. Variety, the entertainment industry's trade paper, predicted in 
that month that it would "shoot out in front with great grosses," and in 
succeeding weeks reported "socko" premiers in various cities against 
competition like For Whom the Bell Tolls, Sweet Rosze O'Grady, Song 
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of Bernadette, and Guadalcanal Diary. For a period of roughly two 
months of first run engagements Sahara was one of a small number of 
productions "actively carrying the ball for the heavy sugar." With 
total receipts for a three month period reaching $2,300,000, it was in-
deed a popular film, one which the American people wanted to see, as 
is attested by its audiences in second and third week showings.15 
The fall of Tobruk in mid-1942 provides the backdrop against 
which the American (and Allied) destiny is played out in Sahara. Nazi 
Germany is still on the offensive, as yet undefeated in the Western 
Theater. An American tank (the only female "character" in the 
movie), appears stranded in the Libyan desert, surrounded by the 
enemy. Wryly acknowledging the precariousness of the situation as ar-
tillery shells fall close at hand, the tank's commander, Humphrey 
Bogart, steers a course through the sandy wastes, hoping to reach the 
fleeing British Eighth Army before the vehicle's meager reserve of fuel 
and water is exhausted. (Actually, the movie could have been titled 
Mojave. Filmed one hundred miles east of Palm Springs, the scenery is 
convincingly arid and lifeless, with not a Joshua tree or mesquite bush 
to be seen. Five hundred training troops from nearby Camp Young 
were utilized for battle sequences.)16 Sgt. Joe Gunn, as his name im-
plies, is the American fighting man of Valley Forge, New Orleans, the 
Bloody Angle, and Chateau-Thierry, a self-willed man of destiny 
hewn from Old Hickory. When asked what part of the United States 
he comes from he replies, "No place, just the army." Yet, like John 
William Ward's portrait of Andrew Jackson, Gunn is more than a 
man of cold steel. Fondly referring to his tank as a "dame," he names 
it Lulubelle after a horse he had once had in the cavalry (his own tie to 
America's fighting past), and speaks fondly, if in sexist terms, of the 
temperamental iron maiden.17 
Bogart's ex-cavalryman is also recognizable as that equally 
venerable American symbol, the cowboy. The setting uncannily 
recalls this figure, as we encounter the modern man on (mechanical) 
horseback in the sandy wastes of the desert. Henry Nash Smith has 
defined this epic American caricature, the man at home in raw 
nature, his native habitat, away from the corruptions of conventional 
life. Gunn, like his frontier predecessors, shows up as if out of 
nowhere, and will fade into nowhere once his avenging or saving mis-
sion has been completed. Both are figures outside of the formal 
geographical constraints of civilization, yet intricately bound to the 
value system of the culture, and in fact cast in the role of that system's 
protector. Such a responsibility, of course, encourages the mounted 
man of will to be a law unto himself, to himself frame the ground rules 
within which the values of the culture will be defined. Yet as students 
of American civilization will recognize, if this defines an essentially an-
tisocial individual, it is precisely this character who has caught the na-
tional imagination ever since the days of Leatherstocking. Ward calls 
this figure "Nature's Nobleman."18 
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The sergeant and his two crewmen soon encounter the bombed-
out remnant of an Allied field hospital and take the survivors aboard 
the Lulubelle. One, an Irish medical officer who outranks Gunn, 
wisely defers command of the enlarged group to the sergeant because, 
ostensibly, it is his tank and he has rescued the others. But in symbolic 
terms leadership has fallen to the Americans because the European 
Allies are shattered and scattered, and America must step into the 
breach.19 (In a truce parlay later in the film, a German officer sneers 
that the Americans are pulling British chestnuts out of the fire, and 
Gunn replies, in effect, that Americans don't like to see burned 
chestnuts.) The rescued Allies also include two Englishmen, another 
Irishman, a French Resistance veteran, and a South African; had 
there been more room on the tank central casting would undoubtedly 
have given us a Dane and a relative of Anne Frank as well. Frenchie is 
the voice of experience; he has served in the Resistance and watched 
the Nazis kill civilian hostages. In explaining to the Americans that 
German planes had just bombed the Allied field hospital in which they 
had served, Frenchie teaches that "a Nazi is like a mad dog." He tells 
the Americans that they can't really comprehend the Germans; there 
is no humanity in them. The dramatic possibilities of this prophetic 
voice are fulfilled later in the picture when Frenchie is shot in the back 
by a German while returning from a truce conference. 
Sgt. Gunn's determination not only to regain Allied lines but to 
keep fighting as well sets the Britishers to grumbling about his foolhar-
diness. One man sarcastically notes that the American sergeant is so 
supremely self-willed that, like Moses, he thinks he could strike the 
rocks and command waters to gush forth.20 The screenplay fulfills this 
water-from-the-rocks prophecy in its final moments, both literally and 
figuratively, but before that point there is much wandering to be done 
in the desert. Lulubelle's band providentially encounters a Sudanese 
corporal (played by veteran black actor Rex Ingram with a touch of 
Southern inflection) and his Italian prisoner. Sgt. Gunn, weighing the 
small group's odds against its water supply, takes the Sudanese aboard 
but leaves the Italian to die in the desert, despite his broken-English 
plea that he has a "wife and bambino" at home and a cousin in " Pitts -
a-burgh" who works in a steel mill and who probably made Lulubelle's 
armor plate. Gunn's nobler instincts and the incipient bonds of 
Italian-American friendship soon overrule his common sense, how-
ever, and he adds the Italian to the tank's burden. (After all, what 
does America stand for: "give me your tired, your poor, your huddled 
masses yearning to breathe free.") The addition of the black Sudanese 
is fortuitous (and symbolic),21 for the native knows of two caravan 
watering points in the area. The first well proves to be dry, and the 
thirsty band presses on toward the second, fifty miles distant. It is 
there that the climactic scenes of the picture will be played out. But 
first the character of the arch German Nazi must be more fully ex-
posed. A Mersserschmitt (actually an American P-40 with German in-
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signia) appears in the sky, and strafes the tank. Gunn orders no return 
fire until the emboldened plane flies too low, implying that classic 
American battlefield order, "don't fire until you see the whites of their 
eyes." Then, with one sure shot in the best dime novel fashion, the 
plane is shot down. On parachuting to earth the sneering blond Luft-
waffe officer arrogantly demands that the Allies surrender to him. 
Disarmed, he is added to the tank's complement, despite the protesta-
tions of Frenchie, the voice of experience, who begs Gunn to allow him 
to take the German prisoner out behind a sand dune until it is time to 
move on. 
During the strafing one of the Englishmen is wounded, and he 
slowly expires as Lulubelle searches for an oasis. Earlier, in the obliga-
tory reminiscence-of-home scene, he had shown everyone a treasured 
picture of his girlfriend; now he dies deliriously murmuring her name. 
An important message for the homefront, this: the boys on the front 
lines must not be forgotten, for they have not forgotten those they have 
left behind. 
Tambul , the Sudanese, leads on through a blinding sandstorm to 
the second abandoned caravan station where a seemingly dry well is 
found to be slowly dripping enough water to provide a few pints to 
share among the small band. Even the two prisoners are given their 
portion, although this kindness will scarcely be repaid in kind by the 
treacherous German. To collect the precious liquid in a tin cup Tam-
bul descends to the bottom of the well, and is joined by one of the 
Americans, a Texan named Waco. Offering the black man a ciga-
rette, Waco inquires about the polygamy practiced by "you Moham-
medans." Tambul replies that he has only one wife, and, seeing 
Waco's surprise, asks how Waco's spouse would appreciate having to 
share her husband's attentions with several other women. The Ameri-
can insists that she wouldn't stand for it, and Tambul adds that his 
wife feels the same way, and, in any case, he is happy with just one 
wife. Waco philosophizes that there sure is a lot to learn from other 
folks in this war, and the gap of race and religion has been effectively 
bridged; the crusade against fascism has united far-flung Allies in in-
ternational brotherhood.22 
The Italian prisoner, a weak yet repentant and basically humane 
man, asks if he might assist Sgt. Gunn in repairing Lulubelle. This 
provides the occasion for a dialogue on the merits of Mussolini. It 
becomes clear that Giuseppe has no deep allegiance to fascism. He ad-
mits to having fought willingly enough, but now has no regrets at be-
ing captured. The misled captive explains that Mussolini plastered his 
mottoes on the walls everywhere, and eventually all Italians came to 
believe them, in fact had to believe them. With a wife and child 
hostage to the state, he could not afford to laugh at II Duce; in fact, he 
had no alternative but to do the dictator's bidding. Sgt. Gunn does not 
dispute the rationalization. One suspects he would not have been so 
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understanding of a similar excuse from the German prisoner. The 
stereotypes of the two enemies are distinctly different. 
Over a rise in the distance appears a German scout car with three 
soldiers, who are promptly captured. They, too, are looking for water, 
an exploratory party for a thirsty mechanized battalion. Prudence and 
faintheartedness tell the British soldiers to flee from this overwhelming 
force, but Sgt. Gunn summons the men with a classic against-
impossible-odds speech. "Why Bataan, why Corregidor?" he asks. To 
delay, to buy time, until the Allies can be strong enough to beat the 
enemy. A timeworn battlefield peptalk to induce volunteers for a 
suicide mission, it works, because of course everyone does remember 
Bataan and Corregidor, not only Gunn's men but the folks in the 
theaters at home as well. So the three Germans are told that there is 
plenty of water in the oasis and that the Allies will trade it for German 
guns, knowing that this will draw the enemy force to the water hole. 
Relieved of the scout car, the Germans return to their unit with this in-
telligence, while Waco sets off (toward Palm Springs?) in the pur-
loined vehicle to try to summon reinforcements for the handful of 
defenders. How, the others ask, can Waco hope to find British troops 
when he doesn't even know if there are any within hundreds of miles? 
He doesn't give the question much philosophical inquiry; he can only 
try. His mission, like that of the remaining men, is the only practical 
course; the Americans sense this instinctively as they metaphorically 
draw the covered wagons around the waterhole and send out a lone 
messenger to summon the cavalry. 
The Germans swallow the bait, or, rather, hope to swallow both 
the small band of defenders and the expected water supply. The final 
reel extends the fight over several waves of attack in classic settlers-
and-Indians style, each time reducing the number of defenders, each 
assault providing another moral to be drawn and hortatory last words 
to be uttered. The German and Italian prisoners are herded, un-
shackled, into the caravan station, the former having led his captors to 
believe he understands no English. But in fact he has overheard and 
understood all, and determines to make a break for the advancing 
German battle line. He commands the Italian to follow him, but 
Giuseppe passionately replies that he is through fighting for Der 
Fuhrer. Hitler with his master race nonsense is to blame for 
everything, including causing Mussolini to become what he was. As 
the camera peers down over the German flier's shoulder, Giuseppe 
gradually rises from his knees as his indictment of the Nazi dictator 
similarly rises in pitch. In a rage the German stabs his former ally in 
the back and, as he makes his escape, the Italian staggers out, knife 
still inserted, to tell in his dying breath of the other prisoner's flight.23 
The German aviator must be stopped before he can reach his 
countrymen, and Tambul follows in pursuit as bullets whiz past him. 
He is wounded and loses his gun, but closes the distance and tackles 
him. The two wrestle on the ground until the black man forces himself 
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astride the blond German and smothers his Nazi face in sand as white 
as his skin. The camera momentarily freezes on this tableau of Aryan 
supremacy's inglorious end. Tambul attempts to return to his com-
rades, but is hit by several shots. He dies within inches of safety, in his 
last breath giving the "thumbs up" gesture to assure the others that he 
has got his man. 
The Germans, out of water and desperate, regroup for another 
charge. How can the remaining four Allies hold off a battalion, one 
asks. Sgt. Gunn replies that it is because the Allies are stronger, the 
Germans never having known the dignity of freedom. Another wave of 
attack comes. The British medical officer tells a wounded comrade he 
is attending to "never say die," and the next instant a mortar shell hits 
both of them directly. This attack is beaten off, but the defenders are 
now reduced to two. 
The scene abruptly shifts to the sandy wastes where we see first 
Waco's abandoned scout car, then his rifle and empty canteen. As he 
crawls up the face of a dune of pure sand, rippling and fluid like a 
wind-whipped lake, the audience is by now suffering Waco's thirst, 
even if it hasn't been eating theater popcorn. Waco is at the end of his 
strength, and, even on all fours, cannot move another inch. His face 
becomes half buried in the shifting sands when, lo, over the dune 
comes a deus ex machina in the horsepower of a British (but Ameri-
can-made) jeep. Waco has risked the ultimate sacrifice, and it has 
paid off. The cavalry has been alerted; the wagon train will be saved. 
Returning our gaze to the caravan station, we see Bogart and his 
one remaining companion awaiting the final charge. The latter asks 
how cold steel feels, and Sgt. Gunn replies laconically that it's all over 
pretty quickly. The Germans appear and are met with fire from the 
sergeant's machine gun. The Germans drop to the ground, and Gunn, 
in anger and despair and triumph, mounts his foxhole and shouts a 
defiant cry, "We ain't surrenderin'. " In other war pictures like Ba-
taan, this would be followed by the final gunburst, although the hero's 
death would not actually be depicted. But Sahara offers a different 
ending. The thirst-crazed Germans, crying "Wasser, Wasser," throw 
down their rifles and come stumbling to find the expected succor. 
Gunn yells, deliriously, hysterically, for them to come and get it. And 
indeed they do, for a German shell, unbeknownst to the two 
defenders, has landed in the well and sent the waters gushing out of 
the ground. The Tommy's prophecy has been fulfilled, with a twist; 
the rock has been smitten, and it gives forth its promise. 
At the fade we see Lulubelle covering at least fifty captured Ger-
mans as they slog along toward British lines. They are met by Waco, 
leading British reinforcements who bring news of the first allied vic-
tory in the West, El Alamein. The reunion is joyful, yet sad with the 
memory of lost comrades. Waco: "How was it?" Gunn: "Pretty 
rough." 
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Unlikely? Yes. Time's review called Sahara a "preposterous 
melodrama about Humphrey Bogart, nine other heroes and a derelict 
tank," but went on to label it "a tr iumphant combination of first rate 
entertainment, intelligent cinematics, and an unusual amount of 
honesty about war." Newsweek confirmed that "their victory against 
such odds sounds as escapist as boy-meets-girl," but concluded that 
"you couldn't ask for more convincing realism in grim detail" in "one 
of the most stirring, completely satisfying battle babies to come out of 
Hollywood." Bosley Crowther loved it too, and so, as we have seen, did 
audiences.24 The critics might have added that it did not depict the 
war as it was actually being fought; no American tank troops, in fact, 
were fighting in that part of North Africa prior to El Alamein. 
Sahara, 97 minutes of well-understated acting and stirring action, 
is, as should by now be apparent, a superb propaganda piece. But 
those responsible for the film were, on a much less conscious level, 
making a deeply nationalistic film. They could escape neither the 
blandishments of the wartime government nor the siren song of their 
own past as it had already been refracted through literature, folklore, 
the cinema, and the American ethos. Sahara is an archetypically 
American vision of the European phase of the Second World War, 
rooted in classic images of the American individual and group charac-
ter as well as in prevailing cardboard stereotypes of cruel Germans and 
misled Italians.25 The important war aims —saving democracy, mobil-
izing an international brotherhood to fight against racist fascism, 
defense of the weak against the arrogant totalitarianism of Germany, 
Japan and their comic-opera ally Italy—are presented in artful sym-
bols drawing on the American citizen-soldier, on the traditions of 
pragmatic action and the use of violence for socially accepted goals, 
and on the stereotype of the western cowboy hero. Joe Gunn and his 
countrymen are indeed American "Everymen." Even the cinema for-
mat is archetypically American—the western movie formula —with its 
diverse cross section of characters in a seemingly inescapable situation, 
decimated one by one until help arrives at the end of the final reel.26 
Critics who have studied war movies have identified those charac-
teristics which separate the undistinguished from the great or near-
great films of that type. Aside from the fact that most of these writers 
list Sahara in the latter category, they reveal some of the artistic, na-
tionalistic, and propagandistic strengths of the genre. Charles 
Champlin has commented that the more riveting war pictures convey 
"a truer account of the fear, the loneliness (including the loneliness of 
command), the confusion, the misery, and the sobering realization 
that the enemy who shot at you was not so much a beast as another 
man who marched to a different rhetoric." Experienced viewers will 
recognize that many World War II movies did not meet this standard, 
but were, as Lawrence Suid notes, mere escapism and adventure, 
transplanted westerns, creating their impact primarily through noise, 
combat and violence.27 But perhaps these observations are too much 
15 
influenced by the 1970s and the disillusionments with the Vietnam 
War; audiences in the early 1940s experienced "their" war through 
different lenses. As pioneer film historian Lewis Jacobs writes, the real 
service of the World War II motion pictures was to "emotionalize" the 
conflict, bring the true nature of the enemy's ideology to public 
awareness, convey a sympathetic image of America's suffering part-
ners, and present, in the best of the films, a dignified portrait of the 
American fighting man that rises helmet and epaulets above the 
celluloid cowboy hero. "In dramatizing the stories of conquered coun-
tries and attempting to tell what Americans and their allies were 
fighting for, the screen psychologically and materially met the crisis 
persuasively and with an urgent sense of its obligations . . . The best 
[of the genre] broke through the barriers of propaganda and enter-
tainment to penetrate the truth of the terror and insanity let loose by 
fascism and by war itself."28 
Humphrey Bogart's Sahara does not quite measure up to Jacobs' 
standard: the terror and insanity of war are not truly focused. But that 
message, after all, is not what most Americans, historically, at least, 
have wanted to remember about their wars. Adventure, excitement, 
comraderie and noble causes are what veterans recall. Dramatically 
and emotionally successful films like Sahara feed on hallowed images 
of Americans emerging successfully from battle after having fought 
against near-impossible odds. This is related to another motif, the in-
vincible American fighting man whose causes are always morally 
right. So although mass violence is legitimized in war as a means of at-
taining national goals, Americans continue to see themselves as a 
peaceloving people.29 Certainly the World War II films tended to 
idealize armed conflict in their depictions of virile action, masculinity 
proved and death challenged. War is necessary, but there is no intrin-
sic pleasure in it, and American soldiers are not contemptuous of 
human life.30 Sgt. Joe Gunn is no macho warmonger. He has a job to 
be done, and there is pride in doing it well, but he makes no claims to 
it being a particularly noble occupation. Thus is the American soldier 
in the national character: brave, self-sacrificing, but a citizen soldier, 
not one who could ever truly relish a lifetime of combat. 
Sahara reinforced beliefs about the uniqueness and superiority of 
the American experience by presenting them through a medium play-
ing a central role in the leisure and fantasy lives of the society. Movie 
audiences were young even before the war, and this was accentuated 
as manpower was drained by the conflict. Many of those who absorbed 
Hollywood's idealized version of the war were impressionable and 
receptive to leitmotivs reinforced through symbolic action set 
simultaneously in a contemporary and fantasy (idealized) setting. 
Writer Larry King remembers that among his peers in the 15-17 age 
bracket who viewed Sahara and other war films in the early Forties 
"the emotional involvement was total," generating "burning 
patriotism." He and the other too-young-to-enlist boys did not 
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faithfully attend the Saturday matinee to see Bob Hope in Caught in 
the Draft, or hear Irving Berlin's patriotic songs in This Is the Army; 
they came for Action in the North Atlantic, Sahara and Thirty 
Seconds Over Tokyo.31 
Was Sahara unique among its genre in the artful use of hallowed 
images from American culture? Every viewer will select his or her own 
favorites, and the process is necessarily subjective. But a case can be 
made for regarding Sahara as more unique than typical of the 
Hollywood "battle babies" filmed during World War II. No other so 
successfully tapped the well of cowboy-frontier imagery, and un-
earthed even traces of Manifest Destiny and the "city upon the hill." 
When 80 to 90 million Americans a week streamed into the movie 
palaces in 1943 to see powerful war dramas like Sahara, they came 
away with pride in their fighting men, renewed faith in the worth of 
the nation's sacrifice and a cathartic experience. True, their emotions 
were being manipulated; they were willing receptors of propaganda. 
But they were also receiving a satisfying reaffirmation of their 
culture's values at a time of great national challenge. To homefront 
Americans in 1943, Sahara was the real war. 
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